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Abstract:   Traditional finance theory based on the assumptions of symmetric information and
perfect and competitive markets has provided many important insights. These include the
Modigliani and Miller Theorems, the CAPM, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and
continuous time finance. However, many empirical phenomena are difficult to reconcile with
this traditional framework. Game theoretic techniques have allowed insights into a number of
these. Many puzzles remain. This paper argues that recent advances in game theory concerned
with higher order beliefs, informational cascades and heterogeneous prior beliefs have the
potential to provide insights into some of these remaining puzzles.1
1.  Introduction
Finance is concerned with how the savings of investors are allocated through
financial markets and intermediaries to firms, which use them to fund their activities.
Finance can be broadly divided into two fields.  The first is asset pricing, which is
concerned with the decisions of investors.  The second is corporate finance, which is
concerned with the decisions of firms. Traditional neoclassical economics did not attach
much importance to either kind of finance.  It was more concerned with the production,
pricing and allocation of inputs and outputs and the operation of the markets for these.
Models assumed certainty and in this context financial decisions are relatively
straightforward.  However, even with this simple methodology important concepts such
as the time value of money and discounting were developed.
Finance developed as a field in its own right with the introduction of uncertainty
into asset pricing and the recognition that classical analysis failed to explain many
aspects of corporate finance. In Section 2, we review the set of issues raised and some of
the remaining problems with the pre-game theoretic literature.  In Section 3, we recount
how a first generation of game theory models tackled those problems, and discuss the
successes and failures.  Our purpose in this section is to point to some of the main themes
in the various sub-fields.  We do not attempt to provide an introduction to game theory
(see Gibbons (1992) for a general introduction to applied game theory and Thakor (1991)
for a survey of game theory in finance including an introduction to game theory).  Nor do
we attempt to be encyclopedic.
This first generation of game theoretic models revolutionized finance but much
remains to be explained.   Game theoretic methods keep developing and we believe that2
some developments involving richer informational models are especially relevant for
finance: in Section 4, we review recent work concerning higher order beliefs and
informational cascades and discuss its relevance for finance.  We also review work that
entails differences in beliefs not explained by differences in information.
2.  The Main Issues in Finance
2.1 Asset Pricing
The focus of Keynesian macroeconomics on uncertainty and the operation of
financial markets lead to the development of frameworks for analyzing risk.  Keynes
(1936) and Hicks (1939) took account of risk by adding a risk premium to the interest
rate.  However, there was no systematic theory underlying this risk premium.  The key
theoretical development which eventually lead to such a theory was von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s (1947) axiomatic approach to choice under uncertainty.  Their notion of
expected utility, developed originally for use in game theory, underlies the vast majority
of theories of asset pricing.
Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model
Markowitz (1952; 1959) utilized a special case of von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s expected utility to develop a theory of portfolio choice.  He considered the
case where investors are only concerned with the mean and variance of the payoffs of the
portfolios they are choosing.  This is a special case of expected utility provided the
investor’s utility of consumption is quadratic and/or asset returns are multinormally
distributed.  Markowitz’s main result was to show that diversifying holdings is optimal
and the benefit that can be obtained depends on the covariances of asset returns.  Tobin’s3
(1958) work on liquidity preference helped to establish the mean-variance framework as
the standard approach to portfolio choice problems.  Subsequent authors developed
portfolio theory considerably (see Constantinides and Malliaris (1995)).
It was not until some time after Markowitz’s original contribution that his
framework of individual portfolio choice was used as the basis for an equilibrium theory,
namely the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  Brennan (1989) has argued that the
reason for the delay was the boldness of the assumption that all investors have the same
beliefs about the means and variances of all assets.  Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)
showed that in equilibrium
Eri = rf + bi(ErM – rF),
where Eri is the expected return on asset i, rf is the return on the risk free asset, ErM is the
expected return on the market portfolio (i.e. a value weighted portfolio of all the assets in
the market) and bi = cov(ri, rM)/var(rM).  Black (1972) demonstrated that the same
relationship held even if no risk free asset existed provided rF was replaced by the
expected return on a portfolio or asset with b = 0.  The model formalizes the risk
premium of Keynes and Hicks and shows that it depends on the covariance of returns
with other assets.
Despite being based on the very strong assumptions of mean-variance preferences
and homogeneity of investor beliefs, the CAPM was an extremely important development
in finance.  It not only provided key theoretical insights concerning the pricing of stocks
but also lead to a great deal of empirical work testing whether these predictions held in
practice.  Early tests such as Fama and Macbeth (1973) provided some support for the4
model.   Subsequent tests using more sophisticated econometric techniques have not been
so encouraging.  Ferson (1995) contains a review of these tests.
The CAPM is only one of many asset-pricing models that has been developed.
Other models include the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1977a) and the
representative agent asset-pricing model of Lucas (1978).  However, the CAPM was the
most important not only because it was useful in its own right for such things as deriving
discount rates for capital budgeting but also because it allowed investigators to easily
adjust for risk when considering a variety of topics.  We turn next to one of the most
important hypotheses that resulted from this ability to adjust for risk.
Market Efficiency
In models with competitive markets, symmetric information and no frictions like
transaction costs, the only variations in returns across assets are due to differences in risk.
All information that is available to investors becomes reflected in stock prices and no
investor can earn higher returns except by bearing more risk.  In the CAPM, for example,
it is only differences in b’s that cause differences in returns.  The idea that the differences
in returns are due to differences in risk came to be known as the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis.  During the 1960’s a considerable amount of research was undertaken to see
whether U.S. stock markets were in fact efficient.  In a well-known survey, Fama (1970)
argued that the balance of the evidence suggested markets were efficient.  In a follow up
piece, Fama (1991) continued to argue that by and large markets were efficient despite
the documentation of many anomalies during the intervening period.5
Standard tests of market efficiency involve a joint test of market efficiency and
the equilibrium asset-pricing model that is used in the analysis.  Hence a rejection of the
joint hypothesis can either be a rejection of market efficiency or the asset-pricing model
used or both.  Hawawini and Keim (1995) survey these “anomalies.”  Basu (1977)
discovered one of the first.  He pointed out that price to earnings (P/E) ratios  provided
more explanatory power than b’s.   Firms with low P/E ratios (value stocks) tend to
outperform stocks with high P/E ratios (growth stocks).  Banz (1981) showed that there
was a significant relationship between the market value of common equity and returns
(the size effect).  Stattman (1980) and others have demonstrated the significant predictive
ability of price per share to book value per share (P/B) ratios for returns.  In an influential
paper, Fama and French (1993) have documented that firm size and the ratio of book to
market equity are important factors in explaining average stock returns.  In addition to
these cross-sectional effects there are also a number of significant time series anomalies.
Perhaps the best known of these is the January effect.  Rozeff and Kinney (1976) found
that returns on an equal weighted index of NYSE stocks were much higher in January
than in the other months of the year.  Keim (1983) demonstrated that the size effect was
concentrated in January.  Cross (1973) and French (1980) pointed out that the returns on
S&P composite index are negative on Mondays.  Numerous other studies have confirmed
this weekend effect in a wide variety of circumstances.
These anomalies are difficult to reconcile with models of asset pricing such as the
CAPM.  Most of them are little understood.  Attempts have been made to explain the
January effect by tax loss selling at the end of the year.  Even this is problematic because
in countries such as the U.K. and Australia where the tax year does not end in December6
there is still a January effect.  It would seem that the simple frameworks most asset
pricing models adopt are not sufficient to capture the richness of the processes underlying
stock price formation.
Instead of trying to reconcile these anomalies with asset pricing theories based on
rational behavior, a number of authors have sought to explain them using behavioral
theories based on foundations taken from the psychology literature.  For example,
Dreman (1982) argues that the P/E effect can be explained by investors’ tendency to
make extreme forecasts.  High (low) P/E ratio stocks correspond to a forecast of high
(low) growth by the market.  If investors predict too high (low) growth, high P/E stocks
will underperform (overperform).  De Bondt and Thaler (1995) surveys behavioral
explanations for this and other anomalies.
Continuous Time Models
Perhaps the most significant advance in asset pricing theory since the early
models were formulated was the extension of the paradigm to allow for continuous
trading.  This approach was developed in a series of papers by Merton (1969; 1971;
1973a) and culminated in his development of the intertemporal capital asset pricing
model (ICAPM).   The assumptions of expected utility maximization, symmetric
information and frictionless markets are maintained.  By analyzing both the consumption
and portfolio decisions of an investor through time and assuming prices per share are
generated by Ito processes, greater realism and tractability compared to the mean-
variance approach is achieved.  In particular, it is not necessary to assume quadratic
utility or normally distributed returns.   Other important contributions that were7
developed using this framework were Breeden’s (1979) Consumption CAPM and Cox,
Ingersoll and Ross’s (1985) modeling of the term structure of interest rates.
The relationship between continuous time models and the Arrow–Debreu general
equilibrium model was considered by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Duffie and Huang
(1985).  Repeated trading allows markets to be made effectively complete even though
there are only a few securities.
One of the most important uses of continuous time techniques is for the pricing of
derivative securities such as options.  This was pioneered by Merton (1973b) and Black
and Scholes (1973) and lead to the development of a large literature that is surveyed in
Ross (1992).  Not only has this work provided great theoretical insight but it has also
proved to be empirically implementable and of great practical use.
2.2  Corporate Finance
The second important area considered by finance is concerned with the financial
decisions made by firms.  These include the choice between debt and equity and the
amount to pay out in dividends.  The seminal work in this area was Modigliani and Miller
(1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961).  They showed that with perfect markets (i.e.,
no frictions and symmetric information) and no taxes the total value of a firm is
independent of its debt/equity ratio.  Similarly they demonstrated that the value of the
firm is independent of the level of dividends.  In their framework it is the investment
decisions of the firm that are important in determining its total value.8
The importance of the Modigliani and Miller theorems was not as a description of
reality.  Instead it was to stress the importance of taxes and capital market imperfections
in determining corporate financial policies.  Incorporating the tax deductibility of interest
but not dividends and bankruptcy costs lead to the trade-off theory of capital structure.
Some debt is desirable because of  the tax shield arising from interest deductibility but
the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress limit the amount that should be used.  With
regard to dividend policy, incorporating the fact that capital gains are taxed less at the
personal level than dividends into the Modigliani and Miller framework gives the result
that all payouts should be made by repurchasing shares rather than by paying dividends.
The trade-off theory of capital structure does not provide a satisfactory
explanation of what firms do in practice.  The tax advantage of debt relative to the
magnitude of expected bankruptcy costs would seem to be such that firms should use
more debt than is actually observed.  Attempts to explain this, such as M. Miller (1977),
that incorporate personal as well as corporate taxes into the theory of capital structure,
have not been successful.  In the Miller model there is a personal tax advantage to equity
because capital gains are only taxed on realization and a corporate tax advantage to debt
because interest is tax deductible.  In equilibrium, people with personal tax rates above
the corporate tax rate hold equity while those with rates below hold debt.  This prediction
is not consistent with what occurred in the U.S. in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when
there were no personal tax rates above the corporate rate.  The Miller model suggests that
there should have been a very large increase in the amount of debt used by corporations
but there was only a small change.9
The tax-augmented theory of dividends also does not provide a good explanation
of what actually happens.  Firms have paid out a substantial amount of their earnings as
dividends for many decades.  Attempts to explain the puzzle using tax based theories
such as the clientele model have not been found convincing.  They are difficult to
reconcile with the fact that many people in high tax brackets hold large amounts of
dividend paying stocks and on the margin pay significant taxes on the dividends.
Within the Modigliani and Miller framework other corporate financial decisions
also do not create value except through tax effects and reductions in frictions such as
transaction costs.  Although theoretical insights are provided, the theories are not
consistent with what is observed in practice.  As with the asset pricing models discussed
above this is perhaps not surprising given their simplicity.  In particular, the assumptions
of perfect information and perfect markets are very strong.
3.  The Game Theory Approach
The inability of standard finance theories to provide satisfactory explanations for
observed phenomena lead to a search for theories using new methodologies.  This was
particularly true in corporate finance where the existing models were so clearly
unsatisfactory.  Game theory has provided a methodology that has lead to insights into
many previously unexplained phenomena by allowing asymmetric information and
strategic interaction to be incorporated into the analysis.  We start with a discussion of the
use of game theory in corporate finance where to date it has been most successfully
applied.  We subsequently consider its role in asset pricing.10
3.1  Corporate Finance
Dividends as Signals
The thorniest issue in finance has been what Black (1976) termed “the dividend
puzzle.”  Firms have historically paid out about a half of their earnings as dividends.
Many of these dividends were received by investors in high tax brackets who, on the
margin, paid substantial amounts of taxes on them.  In addition, in a classic study Lintner
(1956) demonstrated that managers “smooth” dividends in the sense that they are less
variable than earnings.  This finding was confirmed by Fama and Babiak (1968) and
numerous other authors.  The puzzle has been to explain these observations (see Allen
and Michaely (1995) for a survey of this literature).
In their original article on dividends, Miller and Modigliani (1961) had suggested
that dividends might convey significant information about a firm’s prospects.  However,
it was not until game theoretic methods were applied that any progress was made in
understanding this issue.  Bhattacharya’s (1979) model of dividends as a signal was one
of the first papers in finance to use these tools.   His contribution started a large literature.
Bhattacharya assumes that managers have superior information about the
profitability of their firm’s investment.  They can signal this to the capital market by
“committing” to a sufficiently high level of dividends.  If it turns out the project is
profitable these dividends can be paid from earnings without a problem.  If the project is
unprofitable then the firm has to resort to outside finance and incur deadweight
transaction costs.  The firm will therefore only find it worthwhile to commit to a high
dividend level if in fact its prospects are good.  Subsequent authors like Miller and Rock
(1985) and John and Williams (1985) developed models which did not require11
assumptions such as committing to a certain level of dividends and where the deadweight
costs required to make the signal credible were plausible.
One of the problems with signaling models of dividends is that they typically
suggest that dividends will be paid to signal new information.  Unless new information is
continually arriving there is no need to keep paying them.  But in that case the level of
dividends should be varying to reflect the new information.  This feature of dividend
signaling models is difficult to reconcile with smoothing.  In an important piece, Kumar
(1988) develops a ‘coarse signaling’ theory that is consistent with the fact that firms
smooth dividends.  Firms within a range of productivity all pay the same level of
dividends.  It is only when they move outside this range that they will alter their dividend
level.
Another problem in many dividend signaling models (including Kumar (1988)) is
that they do not explain why firms use dividends rather than share repurchases.  In most
models the two are essentially equivalent except for the way that they are taxed since
both involve transferring cash from the firm to the owners.  Dividends are typically
treated as ordinary income and taxed at high rates whereas repurchases involve price
appreciation being taxed at low capital gains rates.  Building on work by Ofer and Thakor
(1987) and Barclay and Smith (1988), Brennan and Thakor (1990) suggest that
repurchases have a disadvantage in that informed investors are able to bid for
undervalued stocks and avoid overvalued ones.  There is thus an adverse selection
problem.  Dividends do not suffer from this problem because they are pro rata.12
Some progress on understanding the dividend puzzle has been made in recent
years.  This is one of the finance applications of game theory that has been somewhat
successful.
Capital Structure
The trade-off theory of capital structure mentioned above has been a textbook
staple for many years.  Even though it had provided a better explanation of firms’ choices
than the initial dividend models, the theory is not entirely satisfactory because the
empirical magnitudes of bankruptcy costs and interest tax shields do not seem to match
observed capital structures.  The use of game theoretic techniques in this field has also
allowed it to move ahead significantly.  Harris and Raviv (1991) survey the area.
The first contributions in a game theoretic vein were signaling models.  Ross
(1977b) develops a model where managers signal the prospects of the firm to the capital
markets by choosing an appropriate level of debt.  The reason this acts as a signal is that
bankruptcy is costly.  A high debt firm with good prospects will only incur these costs
occasionally while a similarly levered firm with poor prospects will incur them often.
Leland and Pyle (1977) consider a situation where entrepreneurs use their retained share
of ownership in a firm to signal its value.  Owners of high value firms retain a high share
of the firm to signal their type.  Their high retention means they don’t get to diversify as
much as they would if there was symmetric information and it is this that makes it
unattractive for low value firms to mimic them.
Two subsequent papers based on asymmetric information which have been very
influential are Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984).  If managers are better
informed about the prospects of the firm than the capital markets they will be unwilling13
to issue equity to finance investment projects if the equity is undervalued.  Instead they
will have a preference for using equity when it is overvalued.  Thus equity is regarded as
a bad signal.   Myers (1984) uses this kind of reasoning to develop the “pecking order”
theory of financing.  Instead of using equity to finance investment projects it will be
better to use less information sensitive sources of funds.  Retained earnings are the most
preferred, with debt coming next and finally equity.  The results of these papers and the
subsequent literature such as Stein (1992) and Nyborg (1995) are consistent with a
number of stylized facts concerning the effect of issuing different types of security on
stock price and the financing choices of firms.  However, in order to derive them strong
assumptions such as overwhelming bankruptcy aversion of managers are often necessary.
Moreover, as Dybvig and Zender (1991) and others have stressed they often assume
suboptimal managerial incentive schemes.  Dybvig and Zender show that if managerial
incentive schemes are chosen optimally the Modigliani and Miller irrelevance results can
hold even with asymmetric information.
A second influential strand of the literature on capital structure that has used game
theoretic concepts is concerned with agency costs.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed
to two kinds of  agency problems in corporations.  One is between equityholders and
bondholders and the other is between equityholders and managers.  The first arises
because the owners of a levered firm have an incentive to take risks; they receive the
surplus when returns are high but the bondholders bear the cost when default occurs.
Diamond (1989) has shown how reputation considerations can ameliorate this risk
shifting incentive when there is a long time horizon.  The second conflict arises when
equityholders cannot fully control the actions of managers.  This means that managers14
have an incentive to pursue their own interests rather than those of the equityholders.
Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) among others have shown how debt can be
used to help overcome this problem.  Myers (1977) has pointed to a third agency
problem.  If there is a large amount of debt outstanding which is not backed by cash
flows from the firm’s assets, i.e. a “debt overhang,” equityholders may be reluctant to
take on safe, profitable projects because the bondholders will have claim to a large part of
the cash flows from these.
The agency perspective has also lead to a series of important papers by Hart and
Moore and others on financial contracts.  These use game theoretic techniques to shed
light on the role of incomplete contracting possibilities in determining financial contracts
and in particular debt.  Hart and Moore (1989) consider an entrepreneur who wishes to
raise funds to undertake a project.  Both the entrepreneur and the outside investor can
observe the project payoffs at each date, but they cannot write explicit contracts based on
these payoffs because third parties such as courts cannot observe them.  The focus of
their analysis is the problem of providing an incentive for the entrepreneur to repay the
borrowed funds.  Among other things, it is shown that the optimal contract is a debt
contract and incentives to repay are provided by the ability of the creditor to seize the
entrepreneur’s assets.  Subsequent contributions include Hart and Moore (1994; 1998),
Aghion and Bolton (1992), Berglof and von Thadden (1994) and von Thadden (1995).
Hart (1995) contains an excellent account many of the main ideas in this literature.
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory of capital structure is such that the
product market decisions of firms are separated from financial market decisions.
Essentially this is achieved by assuming there is perfect competition in product markets.15
In an oligopolistic industry where there are strategic interactions between firms in the
product market, financial decisions are also likely to play an important role.  Allen
(1986), Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1986) and a growing subsequent
literature (see Maksimovic (1995) for a survey) have considered various different aspects
of these interactions between financing and product markets.  Allen (1986) considers a
duopoly model where a bankrupt firm is at a strategic disadvantage in choosing its
investment because the bankruptcy process forces it to delay its decision.  The bankrupt
firm becomes a follower in a Stackelberg investment game instead of a simultaneous
mover in a Nash-Cournot game.  Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1986)
analyze the role of debt as a precommitment device in oligopoly models.  By taking on a
large amount of debt a firm effectively precommits to a higher level of output.  Titman
(1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1993) have considered the interaction between
financial decisions and customers’ decisions.  Titman (1984) looks at the effect of an
increased probability of bankruptcy on product price because, for example, of the
difficulties of obtaining spare parts and service should the firm cease to exist.
Maksimovic and Titman (1993) consider the relationship between capital structure and a
firm’s reputational incentives to maintain high product quality.
A significant component of the trade-off theory is the bankruptcy costs that limit
the use of debt.  An important issue concerns the nature of these bankruptcy costs.
Haugen and Senbet (1978) argued that the extent of bankruptcy costs was limited because
firms could simply renegotiate the terms of the debt and avoid bankruptcy and its
associated costs.  The literature on strategic behavior around and within bankruptcy that
this contribution lead to used game theoretic techniques extensively (see Webb (1987),16
Giammarino (1988), Brown (1989) and for a survey Senbet and Seward (1995)).  It was
shown that Haugen and Senbet’s argument depended on the absence of frictions.  With
asymmetric information or other frictions bankruptcy costs could occur in equilibrium.
The Market for Corporate Control
The concept of the market for corporate control was developed verbally by Manne
(1965).  He argued that in order for resources to be used efficiently, it is necessary that
firms be run by the most able and competent managers.  Manne suggests that the way in
which modern capitalist economies achieve this is through the market for corporate
control.  There are several ways in which this operates including tender offers, mergers
and proxy fights.
Traditional finance theory with its assumptions of symmetric information and
perfectly competitive frictionless capital markets had very little to offer in terms of
insights into the market for corporate control.  In fact the large premiums over initial
stock market valuations paid for targets appeared to be at variance with market efficiency
and posed something of a puzzle.  Again it was not until the advent of game theoretic
concepts and techniques that much progress was made in this area.
The paper that provided a formal model of the takeover process and renewed
interest in the area was Grossman and Hart (1980).  They pointed out that the tender offer
mechanism involved a free rider problem.  If a firm makes a bid for a target in order to
replace its management and run it more efficiently then each of the target’s shareholders
has an incentive to hold out and say no to the bid.  The reason is that they will then be
able to benefit from the improvements implemented by the new management.  They will
only be willing to tender if the offer price fully reflects the value under the new17
management.  Hence a bidding firm cannot make a profit from tendering for the target.
In fact if there are costs of acquiring information in preparation for the bid or other
bidding costs the firm will make a loss.  The free rider problem thus appears to exclude
the possibility of takeovers.  Grossman and Hart’s solution to this dilemma was that a
firm’s corporate charter should allow acquirors to obtain benefits unavailable to other
shareholders after the acquisition.  They term this process “dilution.”
Another solution to the free rider problem, pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny
(1986a), is for bidders to be shareholders in the target before making any formal tender
offer.  In this way they can benefit from the price appreciation in the “toehold” of shares
they already own even if they pay full price for the remaining shares they need to acquire.
The empirical evidence is not consistent with this argument, however.  Bradley, Desai
and Kim (1988) find that the majority of bidders own no shares prior to the tender offer.
A second puzzle that the empirical literature has documented is the fact that
bidding in takeover contests occurs through several large jumps rather than many small
ones.  For example, Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) found that the majority of the initial bid
premiums were over 20% of the market value of the target 10 days before the offer.  This
evidence conflicts with the standard solution of the English auction model that suggests
there should be many small bid increments.  Fishman (1988) argues that the reason for
the large initial premium is to deter potential competitors.  In his model, observing a bid
alerts the market to the potential desirability of the target.  If the initial bid is low a
second bidder will find it worthwhile to spend the cost to investigate the target.  This
second firm may then bid for the target and push out the first bidder or force a higher18
price to be paid.  By starting with a sufficiently high bid the initial bidder can reduce the
likelihood of this competition.
Much of the theoretical literature has attempted to explain why the defensive
measures that many targets adopt may be optimal for their shareholders.  Typically the
defensive measures are designed to ensure that the bidder that values the company the
most ends up buying it.  For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986b) develop a model
where the payment of greenmail to a bidder, signals to other interested parties that no
“white knight” is waiting to buy the firm.  This puts the firm in play and can lead to a
higher price being paid for it than initially would have been the case.
A survey of the literature on takeovers is contained in Hirshleifer (1995).  Since
strategic interaction and asymmetric information are the essence of takeover contests
game theory has been central to the literature.
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
In 1963 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission undertook a study of IPOs
and found that the initial short run return on these stocks was significantly positive.
Logue (1973), Ibbotson (1975) and numerous subsequent academic studies have found a
similar result.  In a survey of the literature on IPOs, Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) give a
figure of 15.3% for the average increase in the stock price during the first day of trading
based on data from 1960-1992.  The large short run return on IPOs was for many years
one of the most glaring challenges to market efficiency.  The standard symmetric
information models that existed in the 1960s and 1970s were not at all consistent with
this observation.19
The first paper to provide an appealing explanation of this phenomenon was Rock
(1986).  In his model the underpricing occurs because of adverse selection.  There are
two groups of buyers for the shares, one is informed about the true value of the stock
while the other is uninformed.  The informed group will only buy when the offering price
is at or below the true value.  This implies that the uninformed will receive a high
allocation of overpriced stocks since they will be the only people in the market when the
offering price is above the true value.  Rock suggested that in order to induce the
uninformed to participate they must be compensated for the overpriced stock they ended
up buying.  Underpricing on average is one way of doing this.
Many other theories of underpricing followed.  These include underpricing as a
signal (Allen and Faulhaber (1989); Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989)), as a
way of inducing investors to truthfully reveal their valuations (Benveniste and Spindt
(1989)), lawsuit avoidance (Hughes and Thakor (1992)) and price stabilization (Ruud
(1993)), among others.
In addition to the short run underpricing puzzle, there is another anomaly
associated with IPOs.  Ritter (1991) documents significant long run underperformance of
newly issued stocks.  During the period 1975-1984 he finds a cumulative average
underperformance of around 15% from the offer price relative to the matching firm-
adjusted return.  Loughran (1993) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) confirmed this long
run underperformance in subsequent studies.
 The theories that have been put forward to explain long run underperformance
are behavioral.  E. Miller (1977) argued that there will be a wide range of opinion
concerning IPOs and the initial price will reflect the most optimistic opinion. As20
information is revealed through time, the most optimistic investors will gradually adjust
their beliefs and the price of the stock will fall.  Shiller (1990) argues the market for IPOs
is subject to an ‘impresario’ effect.  Investment banks will try to create the appearance of
excess demand and this will lead to a high price initially but subsequently to
underperformance.  Finally, Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest that
there are swings of investor sentiment in the IPO market and firms use the “window of
opportunity” created by overpricing to issue equity.
Although IPOs represent a relatively small part of financing activity they have
received a great deal of attention in the academic literature.  The reason perhaps is the
extent to which underpricing and overpricing represent a violation of market efficiency.
It is interesting to note that while game theoretic techniques have provided many
explanations of underpricing they have not been utilized to explain overpricing.  Instead
the explanations presented have relied on eliminating the assumption of rational behavior
by investors.
Intermediation
An area that has been significantly changed by game theoretic models is
intermediation.  Traditionally, banks and other intermediaries were regarded as ways of
reducing transaction costs (Gurley and Shaw (1960)).  Models of banking were not very
rich.  The field was dramatically changed by the modeling techniques introduced in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983).  The paper considers a simple model where a bank
provides insurance to depositors against liquidity shocks.  At the intermediate date
customers find out whether they require liquidity then or at the final date.  There is a cost
to liquidating long term assets at the intermediate date.  A deposit contract is used where21
customers who withdraw first get the promised amount until resources are exhausted after
which nothing is received (i.e., the first come first served constraint).  These assumptions
result in two self-fulfilling equilibria.  In the good equilibrium everybody believes only
those who have liquidity needs at the intermediate date will withdraw their funds and this
outcome is optimal for both types of depositor.  In the bad equilibrium everybody
believes everybody else will withdraw.  Given the first come first served assumption and
that liquidating long term assets is costly, it is optimal for early and late consumers to
withdraw and there is a run on the bank.  Diamond and Dybvig argue the bad equilibrium
can be eliminated by deposit insurance.  In addition to being important as a theory of
runs, the paper was also important in terms of the way in which liquidity needs were
introduced and a similar approach has been adopted in the investigation of many topics.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) together with an earlier paper Bryant (1980) lead to
a large literature on bank runs and panics.  For example, Chari and Jagannathan (1988)
consider the role of aggregate risk in causing bank runs.  They focus on a signal
extraction problem where part of the population observes a signal about the future returns
of bank assets.  Others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an
unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be
high.  Chari and Jagannathan are able to show panics occur not only when the economic
outlook is poor but also when liquidity needs turn out to be high.  Jacklin and
Bhattacharya (1988) compare what happens with bank deposits to what happens when
securities are held directly so runs are not possible.  In their model some depositors
receive a signal about the risky investment.  They show that either bank deposits or
directly held securities can be optimal depending on the characteristics of the risky22
investment.  The comparison of bank-based and stock market-based financial systems has
become a widely considered topic in recent years (see Thakor (1996) and Allen and Gale
(1999)).
Other important papers in the banking and intermediation literature that helped
transform the area were Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Diamond (1984).  Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) developed an adverse selection model where rationing credit is optimal.
Diamond (1984) presented a model of delegated monitoring where banks have an
incentive to monitor borrowers because otherwise they will be unable to pay off
depositors.  A full account of the recent literature on banking is contained in
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993).
3.2  Asset Pricing
Early work incorporating asymmetric information into the asset pricing literature
employed the (non-strategic) concept of rational expectations equilibrium (Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980)).  Each market participant is assumed to learn from market prices but still
believe that he does not influence market prices.  This literature helped address a number
of novel issues, for example, free riding in the acquisition of information.  But a number
of conceptual problems arose in attempting to reconcile asymmetric information with
competitive analysis, and an explicitly strategic analysis seemed to be called for (Dubey,
Geanakoplos and Shubik (1987)).
This provided one motive for the recent literature on market microstructure.  This
is the study of the process and outcomes of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules.
Whereas general equilibrium theory simply assumes an abstract price formation
mechanism, the market microstructure literature seeks to explicitly model the process of23
price formation, usually in the context of financial markets.  The papers that contained
the initial important contributions are Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).  The
subsequent literature that builds on these two papers is sizable.  An excellent account of
this is contained in O’Hara (1995).
Kyle (1985) develops a model with a single risk neutral market maker, a group of
noise traders who buy or sell for exogenous reasons such as liquidity needs and a risk
neutral informed trader.  The market maker selects efficient prices and the noise traders
simply submit orders.  The informed trader chooses a quantity to maximize his expected
profit.  In Glosten and Milgrom (1985) there are also a risk neutral market maker, noise
traders and informed traders.   The main difference between this model and that of Kyle
is that the quantities traded are fixed and the focus is on the setting of bid and ask prices
rather than the quantity choice of the informed trader.  The market maker sets the bid ask
spread to take into account the possibility that the trader may be informed and have a
better estimate of the true value of the security.  As orders are received, the bid and ask
prices change to reflect the possibility that the trader is informed.  Also, the model is
competitive in the sense that the market maker is constrained to make zero expected
profits.
A number of other asset-pricing topics in addition to market microstructure have
been influenced by game theory.  These include market manipulation models (see
Cherian and Jarrow (1995) for a survey).  Also, some financial innovation models use
game theoretic techniques (see Allen and Gale (1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995)).
However, these areas do not as yet have the visibility of other areas in asset pricing.24
Pricing anomalies such as those associated with P/E or P/B ratios that have
received so much attention in recent years are intimately associated with accounting
numbers.  Since these numbers are to some extent the outcome of strategic decisions
analysis of these phenomena using game theoretic techniques seems likely to be a fruitful
area of research.
4.  Richer Models of Information and Beliefs
Despite the great progress that has been made in finance using game theoretic
techniques, many phenomena remain unexplained.  One reaction to this has been to move
away from models based on rational behavior and develop behavioral models.  We argue
that it is premature to abandon rationality.  Recent developments in game theory have
provided powerful new techniques that have the potential to explain many important
financial phenomena.  In this section, we review three lines of research and consider their
implications for finance.
4.1 Higher Order Beliefs
Conventional wisdom in financial markets holds that participants are concerned
not just about fundamentals, but also about what others believe about fundamentals, what
others believe about others’ beliefs, and so on.  Remarkably, the mainstream finance
literature largely ignores such issues; when such concerns are discussed and modeled, it
is usually in the context of models with irrational actors.  Yet the game theory literature
tells us that when there are co-ordination aspects to a strategic situation, such higher
order beliefs are crucially important for fully rational actors.25
How do these issues come to be bypassed?  We believe that this happens because
the models of  asymmetric information that have thus far proved sufficiently tractable to
examine important finance questions are not rich enough to address issues of higher order
beliefs.  If it is assumed that players’ types, or signals, are independent, it is (implicitly)
assumed that there is common knowledge of players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs.
If it is assumed that each signal that a player observes implies a different belief about
fundamentals, it is (implicitly) assumed that a player’s belief about others’ beliefs is
uniquely determined by his belief about fundamentals.  Modeling choices made for
“tractability” often have the effect of ruling out an interesting role for higher order
beliefs.
We will discuss in detail one example illustrating how higher order beliefs about
fundamentals determine outcomes in a version of Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model
of intermediation and bank runs.  In the environment that we will describe, there is a
unique equilibrium. Thus for each possible “state of the world”, we can determine
whether there is a run, or not.  But the “state of the world” is not determined only by the
“fundamentals,” i.e., the amount of money in the bank.   Nor is the state of the world
determined by “sunspots,” i.e., some payoff irrelevant variable that has nothing to do
with fundamentals.  Rather, what matters is depositors’ higher order beliefs: what they
believe about fundamentals, what they believe others believe, and so on.  Our example
illustrates why game theory confirms the common intuition that such higher order beliefs
matter and determine outcomes.  After the example, we will review a few attempts to
incorporate this type of argument in models of financial markets.26
There are two depositors in a bank.  Depositor i’s type is >i; if >i is less than 1,
then depositor i has liquidity needs that require him to withdraw money from the bank; if
>i is more than or equal to 1, he has no liquidity needs and maximizes expected return.  If
a depositor withdraws his money from the bank, he obtains a guaranteed payoff of r > 0.
If he leaves his money in, and the other depositor leaves his money in, he gets a payoff of
R, where r < R < 2r.  But if he leaves his money in, and the other depositor withdraws, he
gets a payoff of zero.
Notice that there are four states of “fundamentals”: both have liquidity needs,
depositor 1 only has liquidity needs, depositor 2 only has liquidity needs and neither has
liquidity needs.  If there was common knowledge of fundamentals, and at least one
depositor had liquidity needs, the unique equilibrium has both depositors withdrawing.
But if it were common knowledge that neither depositor has liquidity needs, they are




With common knowledge that neither investor has liquidity needs, this game has
two equilibria: both remain and both withdraw.  We will be interested in a scenario where
neither depositor has liquidity needs, both know that no one has liquidity needs, both
know that both know this, and so on up to any large number of levels, but nonetheless it
is not common knowledge that no one has liquidity needs.  We will show that in this27
scenario, the unique equilibrium has both depositors withdrawing.  Clearly, it is then
higher order beliefs in addition to fundamentals that determine the outcome.
Here is the scenario.  The depositors’ types, >1 and >2, are highly correlated; in
particular suppose that a random variable T is drawn from a smooth distribution on the
non-negative numbers and each >i is distributed uniformly on the interval [T - e, T + e],
for some small e > 0.  Given this probability distribution over types, types differ not only
in fundamentals, but also in beliefs about the other depositor’s fundamentals, and so on.
To see why, recall that a depositor has liquidity needs exactly if >i is less than 1. But
when do both depositors know that both >i are more than or equal to 1?  Only if both >i
are more than 1 + 2e (since each player knows only that the other’s signal is within 2e of
his own)?  When do both depositors know that both know that both >i are more than 1?
Only if both >i are more than 1 + 4e.  To see this suppose e = 0.1 and depositor 1 receives
the signal >1 = 1.3.  She can deduce that T is within the range 1.2-1.4 and hence that
depositor 2’s signal is within the range 1.1-1.5.   However, if depositor 2 received the
signal >2 = 1.1 then he attaches a positive probability to depositor 1 having >1 < 1.  Only
if depositor 1’s signal was 1 + 4e = 1.4 or above would this possibility be avoided.  This
argument iterates to ensure that there is never common knowledge that payoffs are given
by the above matrix.
What do these higher order beliefs imply?  In fact, for small enough e, the unique
equilibrium of this game has both depositors always withdrawing, whatever signals they
observe. Observe first that by assumption each depositor must withdraw if >i < 1, i.e., if
she or he has liquidity needs.  But suppose depositor 1’s strategy was to remain only if >i
was more than k, for some 1 < k; and suppose depositor 2 observed signal k. For small e,28
he would attach probability about ½ to depositor 1 observing a lower signal, and
therefore withdrawing.  Therefore depositor 2 would have an expected payoff of about
½R to remaining and r to withdrawing.  Since r > ½R by assumption, he would have a
strict best response to withdraw if he observed k.  In fact, his unique best response is to
withdraw if his signal is less than some cut-off point strictly larger than k. But this
implies that each depositor must have a higher cutoff for remaining than the other.  This
is a contradiction. So the unique equilibrium has both depositors always withdrawing.
This argument may sound paradoxical.  After all, we know that if there was
common knowledge that payoffs were given by the above matrix (i.e., both >i were above
1), then there would be an equilibrium where both depositors remained.  The key feature
of the incomplete information environment is that while there are only four states of
fundamentals, there is a continuum of states corresponding to different higher order
beliefs. In all of them, there is a lack of common knowledge that both depositors do not
have liquidity needs. Given our particular assumptions on payoffs, this is enough to
guarantee withdrawal.
We do not intend to imply by the above argument that depositors are able to
reason to very high levels about the beliefs and knowledge of other depositors.  The point
is simply that some information structures fail to generate sufficient common knowledge
to support co-ordination on risky outcomes.  How much common knowledge is
“sufficient” is documented in the game theory literature: what is required is the existence
of “almost public” events, i.e., events that everyone believes very likely whenever they
are true (see Monderer and Samet (1989) and Morris, Rob and Shin (1995)).  While
participants in financial markets may be unable to reason to very high levels of beliefs29
and knowledge, they should be able to recognize the existence or non-existence of almost
public events.
The above example is a version of one introduced by Carlsson and van Damme
(1993).  Earlier work by Halpern (1986) and Rubinstein (1989) developed the link
between co-ordination and common knowledge (see Morris and Shin (1997) for a survey
of these developments).  Morris and Shin (1998) generalize the logic of the above
example to a model with a continuum of investors deciding whether or not to attack a
currency with a fixed peg.  Higher order beliefs are a key determinant of investors’ ability
to co-ordinate their behavior, and thus a key factor in determining when currency attacks
occur.
A number of other models have explored the role of higher order beliefs in
finance.  In Abel and Mailath (1994), risk neutral investors subscribe to securities paid
from a new project’s revenues.  They note that it is possible that all investors subscribe to
the new securities even though all investors’ expected return is negative.  This could not
happen if it was common knowledge that all investors’ expected return was negative.
Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) consider a rational expectations equilibrium
of a dynamic asset trading economy with a finite horizon, asymmetric information and
short sales constraints.  They note that an asset may trade at a positive price, even though
every trader knows that the asset is worthless.  Even though each trader knows that the
asset is worthless, he attaches positive probability to some other trader assigning positive
expected value to the asset in some future contingency.  It is worth holding the asset for
that reason.  Again, this could not occur if it were common knowledge that the asset was
worthless.30
Kraus and Smith (1989) describe a model where the arrival of information about
others’ information (not new information about fundamentals) drives the market.  Kraus
and Smith (1998) consider a model where multiple self-fulfilling equilibria arise because
of uncertainty about other investors’ beliefs.  They term this “endogenous sunspots”.  It is
shown that such sunspots can produce “pseudo-bubbles” where asset prices are higher
than in the equilibrium with common knowledge.
Shin (1996) compares the performance of decentralized markets with dealership
markets.  While both perform the same in a complete information environment, he notes
that the decentralized market performs worse in the presence of higher order uncertainty
about endowments.  The intuition is that a decentralized market requires co-ordination
that is sensitive to a lack of common knowledge, whereas the dealership requires less co-
ordination.
4.2 Informational Cascades
A more developed literature has been concerned with informational cascades.  An
early example was Welch (1992).  A group of potential investors must decide whether to
invest in an initial public offering (IPO) sequentially.  Each investor has some private
information about the IPO.  Suppose that the first few investors happen to observe bad
signals and choose not to invest.  Later investors, even if they observed good signals,
would ignore their own private information and not invest on the basis of the (public)
information implicit in others’ decisions not to invest.  But now even if the majority of
late moving investors has good information, their good information is never revealed to
the market.  Thus inefficiencies arise in the aggregation of private information because31
the investors’ actions provide only a coarse signal of their private information.  This type
of phenomenon has been analyzed more generally by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992).  Finance applications are surveyed in Devenow and Welch
(1996).
It is important to note that informational cascades occur even in the absence of
any payoff interaction between decision makers.  In the Welch (1992) account of initial
public offerings, investors do not care whether others invest or not; they merely care
about the information implicit in others’ decisions whether to invest.  But the argument
does rely on decisions being made sequentially and publicly.  Thus an informational
cascades account of bank runs would go as follows.  Either the bank is going to collapse
or it will not, independent of the actions of depositors.  Depositors decide whether to
withdraw sequentially.  If the first few investors happened to have good news, the bank
would survive; if they happened to have bad news, the bank would not survive.  By
contrast, in the previous section, we described a scenario where despite the fact that all
investors knew for sure that there was no need for the bank to collapse, it had to collapse
because of a lack of common knowledge that the bank was viable.  That scenario arose
only because of payoff interaction (each depositor’s payoff depends on other depositors’
actions, because they influence the probability of collapse); but it occurred even when all
decisions were made simultaneously.
One major weakness of the informational cascade argument is that it relies on
action sets being too coarse to reveal private information (see Lee (1993)).  There are
some contexts where this assumption is natural: for example, investors’ decisions
whether to subscribe to initial public offerings at a fixed offer price (although even then32
the volume demanded might reveal information continuously).  But once prices are
endogenized, the (continuum) set of possible prices will tend to reveal prices.  Two
natural reasons why informational cascades might nonetheless occur in markets with
endogenous price formation have been introduced in the literature.  If investors face
transaction costs, they may tend not to trade on the basis of small pieces of information
(Lee (1997)).  In this case, market crashes might occur when a large number of investors,
who have observed bad news but not acted on it, observe a (small) public signal that
pushes them into trading despite transaction costs.  Avery and Zemsky (1996) exploit the
fact that although prices may provide rich signals about private information, if private
information is rich enough (and, in particular, multi-dimensional), the market will not be
able to infer private information from prices.
4.3 Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs
Each of the two previous literatures we reviewed concerned richer models of
asymmetric information.  We conclude by discussing the more basic question of  how
differences in beliefs are modeled.  A conventional modeling assumption in economics
and finance is the common prior assumption: rational agents may observe different
signals (i.e., there may be asymmetric information) but it is assumed that their posterior
beliefs could have been derived by updating a common prior belief on some state space.
Put differently, it is assumed that all differences in beliefs are the result of differences in
information, not differences in prior beliefs.
For some purposes, it does not matter if differences in beliefs are explained by
different information or differences in priors.  For example, Lintner (1969) derived a33
CAPM with heterogeneous beliefs and – assuming, as he did, that investors do not learn
from prices – the origin of their differences in beliefs did not matter.  It is only once it is
assumed that individuals learn from others’ actions (or prices that depend on others’
actions) that the distinction becomes important.  Thus the distinction began to be
emphasized in finance exactly when game theoretic and information theoretic issues were
introduced.  Most importantly, “no trade” theorems, such as that of Milgrom and Stokey
(1982), established that differences in beliefs based on differences in information alone
could not lead to trade.
But while the distinction is undoubtedly crucial, this does not justify a claim that
heterogeneous prior beliefs are inconsistent with rationality (see Morris (1995) for a
review of attempts to justify this claim; see also Gul (1998) and Aumann (1998)).  In any
case, there is undoubtedly a significant middle ground between the extreme assumptions
that (1) participants in financial markets are irrational; and (2) all differences in beliefs
are explained by differences in information.  We will briefly review some work in
finance within this middle ground.
Harrison and Kreps (1978) considered a dynamic model where traders were risk
neutral, had heterogeneous prior beliefs (not explained by differences in information)
about the dividend process of a risky asset, and were short sales constrained in that asset.
They observed that the price of an asset would typically be more than any trader’s
fundamental value of the asset (the discounted expected dividend) because of the option
value of being able to sell the asset to some other trader with a higher valuation in the
future.  Morris (1996) examined a version of the Harrison and Kreps model where
although traders start out with heterogeneous prior beliefs, they are able to learn the true34
dividend process through time; a re-sale premium nonetheless arises from reflecting the
divergence of opinion before learning has occurred.  Thus this model provides a
formalization of E. Miller’s (1977) explanation of the opening market overvaluation of
initial public offerings: lack of learning opportunities implies greater heterogeneity of
beliefs implies higher prices.
The above results concerned competitive models, and were thus non-strategic.
But heterogeneous prior beliefs play a similar role in strategic models of trading volume.
Trading volume has remained a basic puzzle in the finance literature. It is hard to justify
the absolute volume of trade using standard models where trade is generated by optimal
diversification with common prior beliefs.  Empirically relevant models thus resort to
modeling shortcuts, such as the existence of noise traders.  But ultimately the sources of
speculative trades must be modeled and differences of opinion (heterogeneous prior
beliefs) are surely an important source of trade.
In Harris and Raviv (1993), traders disagree about the likelihood of alternative
public signals conditional on payoff relevant events.  They present a simple model
incorporating this feature that naturally explains the positive autocorrelation of trading
volume and the correlation between absolute price changes and volume as well a number
of other features of financial market data.  A number of other authors have derived
similar results (see, e.g., Varian (1989) and Biais and Bossaerts (1998)).  The intuition for
such results is similar to that of noise trader models.  But we believe that explicitly
modeling the rational differences in beliefs that lead to trade will ultimately lead to better
understanding.35
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